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1. INTRODUCTION
The theory of mechanism design in the presence of adverse selection (unobservable
characteristics) provides an elegant characterization of contractual structures that ensure that
agents possessing private information as to their type truthfully reveal such information to
uninformed principals.  The implementation of such mechanisms results, however, in a
departure from the allocation associated with the first-best optimum.  Asymmetric
information is therefore a potential explanation for failures to achieve Pareto optimality.  In
this paper, we apply the elementary theory of mechanism design to cost-sharing contracts in
developing country agriculture.  This context provides a particularly rich environment in
which to test received theory.  Moreover, in developing country agriculture, deviations with
respect to the first best optimum can have particularly severe consequences in terms of the
welfare of peasant households.  Characterizing the informational structure of markets in
developing countries can therefore provide insights that are of interest to theorists as well as
clues as to those factors that constitute fetters on the development process.
It is probably not unfair to state that opinions regarding the relevance of adverse selection, be
it in developed or developing countries, are divided.  On the one hand, the theoretical
literature concerned with mechanism design has laid heavy emphasis on adverse selection as a
potential cause of departures from the first-best optimum.  The standard textbooks by Laffont
(1990) and Fudenbeg and Tirole (1991) are cases in point.  Similarly, substantial effort has
been expended in the theoretical development literature on the formulation of screening
models that also allow one to account for a number of important stylized facts that
characterize tenancy markets in developing countries (Hallagan, 1978, Newberry and Stiglitz,
1979, Basu, 1982, Allen, 1982, 1985); these include (i) the coexistence of sharecropping
contracts, despite their purported inefficiency, alongside fixed rental contracts, (ii) the
allegedly higher levels of productivity associated with plots farmed under fixed rental
contracts (in comparison with plots under sharecropping), (iii) the relative constancy of the
output sharing rule (50-50) in sharecropping contracts, and (iv) the progressive disappearance
of sharecropping during the development process.
In contrast to the theoretical literature, many development economists, while recognizing that
adverse selection may have a role to play, are of the opinion that it has limited relevance in2
the context of closely-knit village communities, and is therefore neither the basis for a theory
of contractual choice nor the most important cause of the alleged departures from Pareto
optimality observed in developing areas (see, for example, Bardhan, 1984, or Eswaran and
Kotwal, 1985).
Regardless of the ambiguity of informed opinions on the topic, what is undisputable is that
contractual choice models driven by adverse selection have been much less the object of
empirical validation than their moral hazard brethren (typical examples of the empirical moral
hazard literature include Lafontaine and Bhattacharyya, 1995, in the context of franchising
contracts, Shaban, 1987, in the context of sharecropping in India, or Foster and Rosenzweig,
1994, in the case of labor markets in India).  We would suggest that this paucity of empirical
applications stems from the fact that existing models of contractual choice geared specifically
towards adverse selection have few empirically testable hypotheses, at least as these models
are presently formulated, although a number of important contributions have appeared in the
context of auctions (Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong, 1995), the used-car market (Genesove,
1993), and the market for slaves in mid-19
th century America (Pritchett and Chamberlain,
1993).
One notable exception to the preceding characterization of the theoretical literature on
contractual choice is provided by the model developed by Allen (1985), which revolves
around the problem of default risk by tenants, who are assumed to be able to abscond with the
proceeds of their agricultural activities before having paid either their rent or their share of
output.  In this two-period model, low productivity peasants self-select in the first period into
wage contracts through the landlord’s restriction of the amount of land offered to potential
tenants to a level lower than what would be individually rational for low productivity tenants.
High productivity peasants, on the other hand, will find it in their interest to select a tenancy
contract.  All uncertainty as to the potential tenant’s true type is thus resolved in the first
period, and the landlord is able to solve the problem of default risk in the second period
through the appropriate choice of a fixed rental or sharecropping contract.  While Allen’s
model has testable implications in a context in which there is a steady stream of new potential
tenants and in which default risk is important, these assumptions do not square with what is
encountered in many villages in developing countries, where there is little if any movement of
potential tenants from one village to another, and the risk of default is usually negligible.3
It is therefore not surprizing that what little empirical evidence there is on adverse selection in
developing countries has focused on markets in which agents are relatively mobile.  For
example, Foster and Rosenzweig (1993), in a carefully argued paper, examine the casual
agricultural labor market in India, the Philippines and Pakistan.  They obtain a measure of the
productivity of individual workers by focusing on their remuneration when they are employed
using piece rates, and use this information to investigate whether the time-rate wages received
by the same workers reflect this information. Foster and Rosenzweig find that “while a
substantial portion of individual worker skills are rewarded in time-rate wages, the evidence
suggests that there is also considerable ignorance among employers about individual
differences in worker abilities….”.
1  Their results suggest that adverse selection is indeed a
problem in casual labor markets in developing countries, but little can be said regarding the
quantitative importance of the question.  With respect to the presence of adverse selection in
village communities, on the other hand, the evidence is mostly anecdotal.
The point of departure of this paper is agnostic as to the relevance of adverse selection in
village communities.  Indeed, our aim is to ascertain whether adverse selection concerns are
significant as determinants of contractual choice, and thus causes of departures from
optimality, on the basis of empirical evidence driven by a simple model that corresponds
reasonably closely to reality in the field; hence the title.  Of course, basic common sense
suggests that, in a compact society in which agents are relatively immobile, adverse selection
should not be present. The challenge is to see whether a widely-held opinion based on stylized
facts and casual observation is not rejected by hard empirical evidence.
The structure of the paper is as follows.  In section 2 we develop a simple model of cost-
sharing contracts in the absence of asymmetric information and derive hypotheses linking
tenant productivity to (i) contractual choice, (ii) the optimal transfer function from landlord to
tenant and (iii) the share of the cost of a given factor input borne by the tenant.  Given the
appropriate data, all three of these hypotheses are readily testable.
In section 3, we develop the corresponding model under asymmetric information, meaning
that we consider an environment in which landlords cannot observe tenant productivity.  The
testable implications that allow one to empirically distinguish between the two cases are then
                                                       
1 Foster and Rosenzweig (1993), p. 761.  Also see Glaeser (1991) in the context of the US labor market.4
contrasted.  Essentially, when tenant productivity is observable to landlords, (i) contractual
choice (the choice between fixed rental and sharecropping contracts) must be independent of
tenant productivity, (ii) the transfer from the landlord to the tenant in the context of
sharecropping contracts must be  decreasing in tenant productivity, and (iii) a substantial
number of the cost shares (corresponding to the fraction of the cost of a given input that is
borne by the tenant) must be increasing in tenant productivity. The opposite should be true
when landlords cannot observe tenant productivity.  Together, these three hypotheses provide
a powerful test for the ability of landlords to observe tenant household productivity.
In section 4, we construct our measure of potentially unobservable household productivity.
We do so by estimating a plot level production function with household-specific fixed effects,
since all households in our sample from a Tunisian village cultivate more than one plot of
land.  These fixed effects are then purged of the impact of observable household
characteristics in order to arrive at our measure of household productivity.  Since this measure
of household productivity has been orthogonalized with respect to observable household
characteristics, it  represents a measure of household productivity that, in the case of tenants,
is potentially unobservable to landlords.
In section 5, we test the theoretical propositions derived in sections 2 and 3 ; we find that (i)
contractual choice is independent of our measure of tenant household productivity, (ii) the
transfer from landlords to tenants is decreasing in tenant household productivity, and (iii)
none of the cost shares are decreasing in tenant household productivity. These results provide
compelling evidence that landlords do in fact observe the productivity of the tenant
households they face and that adverse selection is therefore not a feature of the market for
tenancies in this village.  We also consider the robustness of our measures of household
productivity.  In particular, we show that the decision of a landlord to rent out her land rather
than cultivating it herself as an owner operator is a decreasing function of our measure of
household productivity as it applies to landlords, as is predicted by our theoretical model.
Furthermore, since our empirical results indicate that adverse selection is not present in the
village, we consider whether contractual choice is independent of our scalar measure of
observable household characteristics (given by that portion of the household-specific fixed
effect that is predicted by observable household characteristics), as well as the household-
specific fixed effect as a whole.  This is a particularly strong implication of our model in the
absence of asymmetric information and, remarkably, it appears to be supported by the data.5
Section 6, which concludes the paper, begins by going out on a limb and attempts to
characterize the functioning of the land rental market in the village by investigating the
empirical relevance of different assumptions regarding matching procedures between
landlords and tenants.  On the basis of measures of the productivity of the potential tenant
available to landlords (for plots that landlords decided to cultivate themselves as owner
operators), we find that an assumption of limited perfect matching in which landlords base
their choice on the best among those tenants with whom they do in fact engage in contractual
relationships appears to be the most consistent with the data in the sense that the probability
of renting out (versus cultivating the plot as an owner-operator) is an increasing function of
actual (for those plots under tenancy contracts) and potential (for those plots under owner-
operatorship) tenant characteristics.  Thus, on the one hand, landlords do observe the
productivity of their potential tenants, and adverse selection is not relevant.  On the other
hand, landlord behavior would appear to be consistent with a relatively limited pool of
potential tenants.  The limited nature of the choice sets used by landlords might therefore
preclude more profitable matches that could, potentially, increase the aggregate agricultural
output of the village.
Finally, given that tenant productivity does not appear to be a significant determinant of
contractual choice, we attempt to provide some clues as to what might be.  First, we offer
some evidence that the size of plots that are rented out is not a choice variable available to
landlords: if plot size were a choice variable, one would expect, at the very least, that
landlords would attempt to equate the marginal productivity of land across plots under owner-
operatorship and plots under tenancy contracts.  The size of plots that are rented out is,
however, a decreasing function of observable (productivity enhancing) tenant characteristics,
contrary to what one would expect if the landlord were attempting to equate the marginal
productivity of land across plots that are rented out and plots that she cultivates herself (it is
also independent of the productivity of landlords).  This result suggest that it is indeed
appropriate to take plot size as being exogenously determined, especially since it was found to
be statistically insignificant in the contractual choice equation, thus casting doubt on its
potential role as a sorting mechanism as would be posited in the model developed by Allen
(1985).6
Second, using limited information regarding the repeated nature of the tenancy relationship
linking a given landlord with a given tenant, we find, somewhat unexpectedly, that the
probability of a contract being a renewal of the previous year’s arrangement is decreasing in
the productivity of the tenant or, in other words, that short-term contracts appear to be
associated with higher productivity tenants. This finding is potentially explained by what we
refer to as the “dumb cousin conjecture”.   We also suggest an alternative explanation, based
on nutrient depletion, that might explain why low productivity tenants would be more likely
to be renewed by landlords.
Third, and at an even finer level of disaggregation, we find, on plots under tenancy contracts
which do not constitute renewals, that the predicted value of the household-specific fixed
effect (that is, that portion of the fixed effect that can be predicted by observable household
characteristics) decreases the probability that the contract in question will be a sharecropping
contract.  For contracts that do represent a renewal, on the other hand, contractual choice is
independent of both components of the tenant’s household-specific fixed effect.  Since
contractual choice remains, in all cases, independent of tenant household productivity, our
basic conclusion that adverse selection does not obtain in the village is upheld.
Finally, given that repeated interaction was the sole variable found to be a statistically
significant determinant of contractual choice, we consider whether our results on contractual
choice might be driven by a problem of simultaneity bias.  We therefore estimate a system of
three probit equations by full information maximum likelihood, where the three equations are
given by a contractual choice equation, a contract renewal equation and, in order to take
transaction costs arguments into account, an equation that seeks to explain why a contract is
either written or oral.  Again, and within a framework in which contract renewal is allowed to
be an endogenous variable in the contractual choice equation, the productivity of the tenant is
statistically insignificant (in the contractual choice equation).  All of these results indicate that
our main finding that adverse selection is not present in contractual relations in this village is
extremely robust to changes in specification.7
2. THE FIRST-BEST OPTIMUM
Preliminaries
Consider a standard sharecropping
2 contract with cost-sharing in which the landlord's
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where  (,) Fx q  represents the production technology,  x the physical input,  b  the share of
production costs borne by the peasant, and where, in conformity with the empirical data, we
assume that the output share is equal to one half for all contracts.
3  We assume that plot size is
fixed and identical for all landlords and is thus unavailable as a contractual instrument.
4  In
order to lighten notation, both the price of the output and the price of the input are normalized
to one.  Moreover, we will assume in much of what follows that both  x and  b   are scalars.
5
The production technology is assumed to satisfy the usual properties :  0,0,0 xxx FFF q >>< .
Both parties to the contract are (in order to simplify the exposition) assumed to be risk-
neutral.  The parameter  q  represents the productivity of tenants and is assumed to be
distributed across the peasant population according to the probability density function  () g q
over the interval [,] qq .  In this section q  will be assumed to be known to both the tenant and
the landlord.
                                                       
2 In what follows, we shall use the terms “sharecropping contract” and “cost-sharing contract” interchangeably,
since, in the Tunisian village that will be the object of the empirical portion of this essay, cost-sharing only
appears in the context of sharecropping contracts.  Moreover, given that there is almost no heterogeneity in the
output share (in almost all cases it is given by a 50-50 split), the only significant source of variations in
contractual form in sharecropping contracts in the village is given by their cost-sharing component.
3 Several explanations have been given in the literature for the relative constancy of output shares.  These include
(i) fairness, (ii) social norms, and (iii) transaction costs involved in a finer definition of output shares.   Theorists
have also found imaginative manners of justifying the resort to linear sharing rules (HolmstrÖm and Milgrom,
1987, Hurwicz and Shapiro, 1978)
4 This assumption is crucial for what follows.  In contrast to our model, the choice of plot size is the key to the
model proposed by Allen (1985).  In the empirical portion of the paper, we present evidence that lends support to
our assumption concerning the exogeneity of plot size.
5 The model generalizes straightforwardly to the case where  x is a vector; where appropriate, the implications
of higher-dimensionality will be spelled out explicitly.8
The key to understanding an empirically observable cost-sharing contract in terms of the
standard theory of adverse selection lies in its cost-sharing component.  Note that the
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The expression  (1) tx b =-   thus represents the transfer from the landlord to the peasant.
This expression is readily observable using the survey data at our disposal since we possess
information regarding both the level of inputs used at the plot level as well as the share of the
cost of each input borne by the tenant.
The first-best optimum
We consider a situation in which relative factor endowments are such that land is relatively
scarce and sufficiently well-qualified potential tenants are relatively numerous, resulting in
competition among tenants for tenancy contracts.  This assumption squares quite nicely with
the observed relative factor endowments encountered in the Tunisian village that will be the
object of our empirical analysis, as well as with the general perception expressed by the
inhabitants of the village that we encountered during fieldwork.  The landlord’s optimization
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where  W  is the tenants’ (common) level of reservation income.
6  Since the constraint is
necessarily binding (the landlord’s profits being decreasing in t), we can substitute for t into
the objective function, yielding the following unconstrained problem :
{ }
max(,)
x FxxW q -- .
This yields the following characterization of the optimal contract :
(1) (,())10 x Fx qq
* -=,
                                                       
6 For simplicity, we assume that q  is strictly a measure of the agricultural productivity of tenants and does not
lead to differences in reservation levels of tenant income.  Later on, we shall briefly discuss empirical evidence







that is, the landlord sets the first-best optimum level of factor inputs and adjusts the transfer
function so that the tenant is just indifferent between accepting a cost sharing contract and
pursuing her alternative activity.
Consider now the relationship linking the optimal transfer function to the tenant’s














































Thus  ()/ dxd qq
*  will be positive as long as  0 x F q ‡ , which corresponds to the usual Spence-
Mirlees sorting condition (Spence, 1974, Mirlees, 1971).  In what follows, we shall assume
that this is indeed the case. This implies that the relationship between the transfer function and
q  will be ambiguous, at least as long as we do not impose additional constraints on the






















What sort of assumption leads to a clearly defined sign in equation (4) ?  Consider the
following three potential restrictions on the production technology :

















ASSUMPTION B :   (,) Fx q  is of the form  (,)() FxFx qq = .
ASSUMPTION C :   (,) Fx q  is homogeneous of degree  1 k <  in  x,
                   that is : ()(),0
k FxFx hhh => .10
These three assumptions allow one to state the following PROPOSITION :
PROPOSITION 1 :   In the absence of adverse selection,
(i)  under ASSUMPTION A,  ()/0 dtd qq
* < ;
(ii) under ASSUMPTIONS B and C, and for  (0,1/2) k ˛ ,  ()/0 dtd qq
* < .
PROOF : (i) immediate; (ii) see APPENDIX.
Since it does not appear implausible to assume that productivity  q  enters in multiplicative
form in the production technology (and this corresponds to the empirical parameterization
implemented in section 4) we will also invoke ASSUMPTION B in section 3 when dealing with
the same problem under asymmetric information.
The preceding result in terms of the transfer function can easily be transposed into the context
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Again, there is no clear manner of signing this expression without additional restrictions on
the technology.   Under ASSUMPTIONS B and C, however, we have the following :11
PROPOSITION 2 :  In the absence of adverse selection, under ASSUMPTIONS B and C (and
for  (0,1) k ˛ ),
(i)  when  x is a scalar,  ()/0 dd bqq
* > ;
(ii)  when  x is an  N -dimensional vector of factor inputs
1 (,...,,...,) jN xxxx = , a necessary condition for the transfer
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i.e., it cannot be the case that  ()/0, j ddj bqq
* <" .
PROOF : see APPENDIX.
Note that PROPOSITION 2 (ii) simply reflects that there are many ways to skin a cat when the
cost-sharing component of the contractual instrument is multidimensional, in contrast to when
it is constituted by a scalar  () bq
* .  That is, not all cost shares need to be increasing in q   for
the transfer function to be decreasing in q , but a sufficiently large proportion of them must
necessarily be so.
It is worth pointing out that, at the optimum, a landlord’s profit is an increasing function of
her tenant’s level of productivity, since, by the Envelope Theorem :










This result implies that there is a lower bound on the type of peasant that will be offered a
cost sharing contract.  This limit type, which we may denote by q¢, is defined implicitly by
(,())() FxxWR qqq
** ¢¢¢ --= , where  R  is the (common) individually rational level of
profits of landlords.
As a final note to this section, consider the problem of contractual choice.  Suppose that,
besides offering their plot of land under a sharecropping tenancy, landlords also have the
option of offering fixed rental contracts.  In this case, their optimization problem, if we adhere
to the notation used so far, is given by :
{ } , max..(,)
xt tstFxxtW q --+‡ ,12
where  t -  represents the rental payment (which is independent of output) from the tenant to
the landlord.  Since the tenant’s individual rationality constraint holds with equality, this last
problem can be translated into the unconstrained problem :
{ }
max(,)
x FxxW q -- .
The optimal contract is obviously characterized by the conditions :




The first FOC, being identical to equation (1), implies that the level of inputs will be the same
under a fixed rental contract as under a cost-sharing contract.  Evaluated at the optimum, the
landlord’s objective function is manifestly given by
(,())() FxxW qqq
** -- ,
which is identical to the corresponding expression for the cost sharing contract.  It follows
that landlords are indifferent between the two contractual forms. Moreover, since tenants are
always held to their individually rational level of income, they too are indifferent between
selecting a cost sharing or a fixed rental contract,  q " .  We state this obvious result as a
PROPOSITION for reference in what follows :
PROPOSITION 3 :  In the absence of adverse selection, the probability of choosing a fixed
rental contract over a sharecropping contract is independent of  q .
This general indifference property corresponds to the classic result due to Cheung (1968,
1969), transposed to the context of adverse selection (Cheung addressed the issue of moral
hazard in the presence of a costless supervision technology).
3. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
In contrast to the preceding section, we now assume that q  is unobservable to the landlord.
The timing of the one shot game between tenants and landlords is as follows : (i) the landlord
announces a menu of sharecropping contracts represented by the transfer function  () t q  and a
level of physical input  () x q ; (ii) the peasant then selects the contractual relationship of her
choice, which means formally that she chooses a message q%  as a function of her true type q .13
The Revelation Principle and incentive compatibility
By the Revelation Principle, we know that the landlord can confine her attention to
mechanisms that induce the potential tenant to truthfully reveal her type, i.e., the best
response that a potential tenant can make to a contractual offer is to report her true type  q











The necessary first order condition (FOC) for the existence of an incentive compatible

































































Notice that differentiating equation (8) with respect to q  (equation (8) is an identity and its









































Since, by assumption,  (,())0 x Fx q qq ‡  (the Spence-Mirlees sorting condition, see section 2),










By the usual arguments (e.g. Laffont, 1990, chapter 10) these local necessary conditions are
sufficient globally.
Note that equation (8) is a first order differential equation that defines the optimal transfer
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Moreover, for it to be accepted by the tenant, the contract must satisfy the following
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The appropriate choice of the constant of integration  K  in equation (13) thus allows one to
readily satisfy this individual rationality constraint.
The landlord’s problem under asymmetric information
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where it is worth recalling that the first two constraints (equations (8) and (10)) guarantee
truthful revelation of q , while the third constraint (equation (12)) ensures that tenants accept
the proffered contracts.  We shall now transform the constrained optimization problem given15
by PROBLEM A into one of optimal control that is amenable to treatment by Pontryagin’s
Maximum Principle.
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Obviously, in the absence of informational asymmetries, this surplus was zero as each tenant
was driven down to her individually rational level of income (see equation (2) in section 2).
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Since the tenant’s surplus is increasing in  q , it follows that if the individual rationality
constraint (re-expressed as  ()0 S q ‡ ) holds for the lowest productivity tenant (of type q ), it
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In what follows, and in order to render the derivations analytically tractable, we will assume
that the probability density function of  q   can be represented by the uniform density.
Moreover, in order to simplify notation, we impose the normalization  1 qq -= .  It follows
that we may rewrite the landlord’s optimization problem as :16
PROBLEM B


























This is simply an optimal control problem in which the control variable is  () x q  and the state
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where  () lq  is the costate variable, and where, for the time being, we ignore the constraint
given by equation (10).  A straightforward application of Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle



























plus the transversality condition :
(17) ()0 lq = .
Consider equation (15).  Using the transversality condition (equation (17)) allows one to
integrate this differential equation, yielding :
(18) () lqqq =-.
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For the special case in which the landlord is dealing with a peasant of productivity qq = , we
get the usual result that  ˆ()() xx qq
* =  : the lowest productivity tenant uses the level of input
that corresponds to the first-best optimum ; all other tenants (with qq > ) extract a positive17
surplus from the contractual relationship ( ()0 S q >  for  qq > ) because of the distortion
induced by the non-observability of q .
Now the pertinent question is whether  ˆ() x q  is increasing in q  as is required by the constraint
that we have so far neglected ( ()/0 dxd qq ‡ , equation (10)).  By implicit differentiation of
equation (20), it is immediate that  ˆ() x q  will be increasing in q  as long as
(21)















Is this a reasonable assumption in the context of this model ?  Suppose that ASSUMPTION B is
satisfied (namely, that  (,)() FxFx qq = ).  Then we have  (,)()0 xxxx FxFx q q =< ,
(,)0 x Fx qq q =  and  ˆ() x q  is manifestly increasing in q .
ASSUMPTION B is, of course, stronger than what one really needs to guarantee that the input
level is increasing in the tenant’s productivity, but it is somewhat more appealing at the
heuristic level than the condition that follows directly from equation (21).
Note that, under ASSUMPTION B we can write :
(,())(()) xx FxFx qqqq =  and  (,())(()) xx FxFx q qqq = .
It follows that one can rewrite equation (20) as :
1 ˆˆ (())1()(())0
2
xx FxFx qqqqq -+-= .
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Since the corresponding value in the first best optimum under ASSUMPTION B is given by
1 ()(1/) x xF qq
*- = ,
it follows that  ˆ()() xx qq
* ‡ .  Under ASSUMPTION B, the landlord is thus compelled to set a
level of input that is higher than the first best optimal level in order to mitigate the adverse
selection problem.18
What will the relationship between the optimal transfer and q  be in this context when  ˆ() x q  is
indeed the solution to the landlord’s problem, that is, when the condition given by equation
(21) is satisfied?  The answer is given in the following PROPOSITION :
PROPOSITION 4 :   In the presence of adverse selection, and when equation (21) is satisfied
(and a fortiori under ASSUMPTION B),   ˆ()/0 dtd qq ‡ .
PROOF : see APPENDIX.
Thus, the optimal transfer function in the presence of asymmetric information, is an
unambiguously increasing function of  q  as long as the condition given in equation (21) is
satisfied.  This result will be obvious to readers familiar with the mechanism-design literature.
In order to derive the corresponding comparative statics for the cost share recall, since
ˆ ˆ ˆ ()(1())() tx qbqq =- , that :
(22)








where  ˆ() bq  denotes the optimal cost share under asymmetric information.  Solving for
ˆ()/ dd bqq  yields :
(23)











Substituting the expression for ˆ()/ dtd qq  from the proof of PROPOSITION 4 (see APPENDIX)
yields :
(24)













The sign of this last expression is ambiguous.
We can make some headway in understanding the source of this ambiguity by considering
equation (24) under ASSUMPTIONS B and C.  We do so in the following PROPOSITION :19
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PROOF : see APPENDIX.
The interest of this rather cumbersome expression lies in the fact that it highlights that the
sign of  ˆ()/ dd bqq  depends not only on q  but, more importantly, on W , the reservation level
of the tenant’s utility.  For relatively large values of  W , it will be more probable that
ˆ()/ dd bqq  > 0, whereas the opposite will be true for relatively small values of W .
7
In order to drive home this point, and to provide some intuitive content to what has been so
far a rather abstract discussion, consider the following parametric example in which the
differential equation that implicitly defines the optimal transfer function  ˆ() t q  (equation (12))
yields a closed-form solution.  Let  (,) Fxx qq = .  Then it is immediate that :
( ) ( )












It follows that one may write :
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Straightforward integration of this expression thus yields :
2 33 ˆ()
88
tK qqqq =-+ ,
where  K  is a constant of integration that must be chosen so as to satisfy the individual
rationality constraint.  From the individual rationality constraint (equation (12')), we can then
immediately deduce that the constant of integration in the preceding expression is given by
KW = .  It follows that the optimal transfer function is given by :
2 33 ˆ()
88
tW qqqq =-+ .















Differentiation with respect to q  then yields:













The optimal cost share under asymmetric information can therefore be an increasing or a
decreasing function of  q , depending upon the value of the tenant's reservation level  of
income and on her level of unobserved productivity,  q , since  ˆ()/0 dd bqq <  for
16/ W qqq >- , whereas  ˆ()/0 dd bqq >   for  16/ W qqq <- .
Rental contracts and contractual choice under asymmetric information
Consider now a fixed rental contract.  It is easily shown (the proof is relegated to the
APPENDIX as it is similar to that for the cost sharing contract) that, under a fixed rental
contract, the derivative of the tenant’s surplus with respect to q  will be given by
ˆ ˆ ()(,())0 SFx q qqq =‡ & ,
while the input level (denoted here by  ˆ ˆ() x q ) under the fixed rental contract will be implicitly
determined by
ˆˆ ˆˆ (,())1()(,())0 xx FxFx q qqqqqq -+-= .
(Note that  ˆ ˆ() x q  will be increasing in  q  under a condition, given in the APPENDIX, that is
similar to equation (21);  ˆ ˆ() x q  will, of course, be increasing in q  under ASSUMPTION B).  For
a fixed rental contract to be chosen by a peasant of type  q  over the corresponding cost
sharing contract, it must be the case that the surplus she receives from doing so is greater than
what she would receive under cost sharing.  This corresponds to the condition that
 (25) ( ) ReRe









The following  PROPOSITION establishes that this is indeed the case, at least under
ASSUMPTION B.  A  COROLLARY, relegated to the  APPENDIX, establishes conditions under
                                                                                                                                                                            
7 This ambiguity necessarily carries over to the case in which x is an N-dimensional vector of factor inputs (see
PROPOSITION 2 (ii) for the case in the absence of adverse selection).21
which the converse of PROPOSITION 6 is true, namely that higher productivity tenants will
choose cost-sharing contracts over fixed rental contracts.
8
PROPOSITION 6 :  In the presence of adverse selection, and under  ASSUMPTION B, the
probability of choosing a fixed rental contract over a sharecropping
contract is an increasing function of q .
PROOF : see APPENDIX.
Summary of testable hypotheses
What is the upshot of all this? The empirically relevant differences between the first best
optimum and the case of asymmetric information are given by PROPOSITIONS 1 to 6.  First, in
the absence of adverse selection concerns, contractual choice will be independent of the
productivity of the tenant, parameterized by  q  ( PROPOSITION 3), whereas when adverse
selection is present, the probability of choosing a cost-sharing over a fixed rental contract will
be significantly related to q  (PROPOSITION 6). Second, if the problem of adverse selection is
not pertinent per se, then the transfer from the landlord to the tenant will be a decreasing
function of the tenant’s level of productivity, (PROPOSITION 1).  On the other hand, in the
presence of asymmetric information, that is, when there is a departure from the first best
optimum caused by the presence of adverse selection, then the transfer from the landlord to
the tenant will be an increasing function of the productivity of the tenant (PROPOSITION 4).
Third, in the absence of adverse selection, it cannot be the case that all of the cost-shares
borne by the peasant are decreasing functions of  q  (PROPOSITION 2).   In the presence of
adverse selection, on the other hand, the relationship can go in either direction (PROPOSITION
5).  The following table synthesizes the testable hypotheses that allow one to distinguish
between contractual environments where adverse selection is present from those in which it is
absent.
                                                       
8 Why, intuitively, should this ambiguity persist, when other authors (e.g. Braverman and Guasch, 1984) have
been able to persuasively sign contractual choice as a function of a peasant’s unobservable level of productivity ?
The answer is simple, and lies in their restriction to linear or piecewise linear contracts.  Here, on the other hand,
through our use of the general form  () t q , which is readily interpretable in terms of cost-sharing, we are not
restricting our attention to any given class of transfer functions. Note also, as pointed out by Braverman and
Stiglitz (1982), that cost-sharing is simply an example of an interlinked sharecropping contract.22
Testable hypothesis No adverse selection Adverse selection
Choice between fixed rental
and sharecropping contracts
(PROPOSITION 3)

















Transfer from landlord to
tenant under a cost-sharing
contract
(PROPOSITION 1)









Share of cost of a given factor
input  j  borne by the tenant
(PROPOSITION 2)
Cannot be a decreasing function of
tenant productivity for all factor
inputs
i.e., it cannot be the case that
()/0 j ddj bqq
* <"
(PROPOSITION 5)
Can be either an increasing or a
decreasing function of tenant
productivity
()/0 j dd bqq
* <
>
These contrasting implications allow us to test directly for the relevance of adverse selection,
since we have data (stemming from cost sharing and fixed rental contracts in Tunisia)
regarding (i) contractual choice, (ii) the transfer function from landlords to tenants under cost-
sharing, and (iii) the cost share associated with each factor input.  It is worthwhile
emphasizing that the theoretical propositions summarized above provide a powerful test for
the presence or absence of adverse selection, as well as of the validity of the underlying
theoretical model per se.  To whit, if adverse selection characterizes contractual relationships
in the village and the theoretical model represents a reasonable approximation to the reality in
the field, there are three testable implications that must simultaneously be verified.  The same
is true were adverse selection to be absent.
4. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION : CONSTRUCTING
A MEASURE OF HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTIVITY
The main empirical challenge that is addressed in this section is that of constructing a
plausible indicator of each tenant’s level of productivity q  with which to test the hypotheses23
formulated in our theoretical treatment of the problem.  Our empirical implementation of the
theoretical model outlined in sections 2 and 3 is divided into two parts.  First, we estimate a
plot-level production function for all households in the sample using panel estimation with
household-specific fixed effects.  We are able to do so because we have plot level data at our
disposal, and all households in the sample cultivate two or more plots of land: the two
dimensions of the panel are therefore plots, on the one hand, and households, on the other (the
resulting panel is unbalanced).  Estimation based on the within estimator allows us to obtain a
measure of household-specific fixed effects.  Second, this measure of total household
productivity is purged of observable household characteristics in order to arrive at a measure
of household productivity that will be potentially non-observable to landlords.
9  This
“purged” variable corresponds to the parameter q  that constituted the crux of the theoretical
portion of the paper.  In part 5, we use these measures of household-specific productivity to
explicitly test the three hypotheses formulated in sections 2 and 3.  We also consider several
ancillary hypotheses that follow from our theoretical model in order to assess the robustness
of our measure of household productivity.  Finally, in part 6 (which also concludes the paper)
we consider the empirical  relevance of those determinants of contractual choice that are not
part and parcel of our theoretical model, offer some evidence regarding the mechanism
through which landlords and tenants would appear to match, and provide additional evidence
that confirms the robustness of our basic results to changes in specification.
Parameterizing the model
Let i index plots of land and let h index tenant households ( 1,...,,1,..., iIhH == ).  A plot
is defined as a parcel of land on which a given crop is cultivated during a given season (there
are two agricultural seasons in the agroclimatic zone to which the Tunisian village in question
belongs).   The production technology is described by the function :
((,),(,,),) hhihiiih FZxXTA lqh ,
where
                                                       
9 It is interesting to note that Glaeser (1991) uses a procedure that is similar in spirit to our own to investigate the
knowledge available to employers regarding their employees, in the context of the US labor market.  His
measure of potentially unobservable worker productivity is given by the residual of a regression of the
employee’s wage on schooling and potential work experience.24
h  h Z  is a  K  dimensional vector of observable household characteristics that directly
affect agricultural productivity (each household characteristic will be denoted by  kh Z ,
1,..., kK = ) ;
h  i A  is an  M  dimensional vector of observable plot-specific characteristics ;
h  ih X  is an  N  dimensional vector of physical inputs on plot i; each individual input
will be written  jih X  where  j  ( 1,..., jN = ) indexes each input ;
h   i T  is the surface of the plot of land ;
h  h q  is a scalar measure of household productivity that may, potentially, be
unobservable to landlords when  h q  corresponds to tenants ;
h  (.,.) l  is an aggregator function which transforms the  1 K +  dimensional vector of
observable household characteristics and household productivity into a scalar measure
of total household productivity; this function is strictly increasing in  h q ;
h  (.,.,.) x  is an aggregator function that transforms the  1 NM ++  dimensional vector
of observable physical inputs, plot characteristics and plot size, into a scalar measure of
factor input; this function is increasing in each  i X , as well as in  i T ;
h  ih h  is the household-plot level disturbance term, which represents stochastic shocks
to production such as pest infestations and weather.







= = ￿ .
Through the appropriate normalization of  h q , this specification corresponds to ASSUMPTION B
(multiplicative productivity).  Then the production function can be rewritten, after taking









= =+++ ￿ 14243 .
Note that our disturbance term  ihhih eqh =+ is composed of two parts : an unobservable (to
the econometrician) household effect ( h q ), and the household-plot disturbance ( ih h ).  The25
problem were one to estimate this equation by ordinary least squares is that it is clear (even
assuming that  ih h  is orthogonal to the explanatory variables) that
(27) (|,,,)(|,,,)0 ihihhiihihhii EXZTAEXZTA eq =„ .
This is because, a priori, we expect  h q  to be correlated with  ih X  since optimizing behavior on
the part of the peasant implies that  ((,),,) ihihhhii XXZTA lq =  (in the case of adverse
selection, this would be the empirical counterpart to equation (20) in section 3 above). This is
where the within estimator becomes important:
10 for variables that vary across plots and are
correlated with  h q , transforming the former into deviations with respect to their
corresponding household means provides legitimate instruments because they will no longer
be correlated with the fixed effect.  In other words, the projection that is used in the within
estimator (transforming variables into differences with respect to their household mean)
effectively orthogonalizes the elements of  ih X  with respect to  h q .  Thus, we will be able to
obtain an unbiased and consistent estimate of 
1
kK
hkkh k Z qg
=
= +￿  as well as of the other
parameters of interest in the production technology.  Given that the empirical issue that we
must address in the context of production function estimation is obtaining a measure of
household productivity  h q  (that landlords, when  h q  applies to tenants, will potentially not be
able to observe), we may be reasonably confident that, by using the within estimator, we are
able to fulfill this task.
Of course, it is possible that  ih X  (again because it is chosen according to equation (20) and is
not randomly drawn by nature) is correlated with the household-plot disturbance term  ih h ,
which may represent omitted plot characteristics as well as idiosyncratic shocks.
  11  In this
case, the obvious answer is to apply an instrumental variable estimator based on exogenously
determined plot-level instruments. These are, however, not available. Another possible
solution, given that the data we will be using corresponds to four seasons (two seasons for
each year) would be to include plot-specific fixed effects that would allow one to control for
time-invariant unobservable plot characteristics.  We are unable to do so since we cannot
                                                       
10 See, e.g., Hausman and Taylor (1981, p. 1380), for a particularly clear exposition.
11 Fafchamps (1993) shows, in the context of West African agriculture, that this problem may indeed be
significant.26
follow a given plot over time because of the particular manner in which the land rental market
operates in the village.
12
A final argument in favor of using the within estimator in order to obtain a measure of
household productivity stems from the origins of the estimator itself.  Both Hock (1962) and
especially Mundlak (1961) proposed the within estimator as a means of obtaining estimates of
production function parameters that would be free of omitted variable bias due to
unobservable household-level characteristics.
Specifying the production technology
An important issue that must be addressed in the context of the estimation of equation (26)
involves the specification of the functional form for  ((,,)) ihii FxXTA .  There are many
options available (see, e.g. Nadiri (1982) for a summary) but our choice is conditioned by dint
of the fact that (i) there are a substantial number of observations for which certain inputs are
zero, and (ii) we believe it to be inappropriate in this particular context to assume a constant
elasticity of substitution among all factor inputs.  Our choice falls upon the modified nested or
two-level CES production function (Sato (1967); see Udry (1996) for a recent application).
We divide our factor inputs into two subgroups, in which the aggregator takes the CES form.
Our two subgroups here are land on the one hand, and labor, on the other.  Labor is an
aggregate of family labor ( FAMLAB X ) and hired labor ( HIRELAB X ).  Land (LAND), for its part, is
an aggregate of chemical fertilizer and herbicides ( HERBFERT XX + ) and manure ( MANURE X )
costs and a modified measure of land.  This modified measure of land takes into account the
area of the plot (T ), as well as soil type through four dummy variables ( ,1,...,4 c SOILc = ),
an irrigated plot dummy ( IR d ), and plowing intensity ( PLOW X ).  To be more specific, the
functional form that is implemented (where we drop the plot and household subscripts for
clarity) is given by :
                                                       
12 For example, plot A under owner-operatorship in the season 1 may be divided into plot B under sharecropping
and plot C under owner-operatorship in season 2, where plot C also includes portions of what corresponded to a
plot D in season 1.  The inability to follow plots over time is, unfortunately, a common characteristic of detailed
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Finally, note that once equation (26) has been estimated using the functional forms given by




hkkh k Z qg
=
= +￿ .  This is because the within procedure will sweep out  h q  as
well as the observable household-specific variables  h Z  that are constant across all plots
worked by a given household.  It follows, in order to obtain our measure of  h q , that we will
then have to regress the household-specific fixed effect stemming from the production
function estimation on the vector of observable household characteristics in order to purge
any observable household effects from our measure of potentially unobservable household
productivity.  The residual from this last equation will yield our estimate of potentially
unobservable household productivity  h q , whereas the predicted value of the fixed effect
(predicted, that is, by observable household characteristics) yields a scalar measure of
productivity-enhancing observable household characteristics.
13  Of course, if the empirical
tests implemented in what follows should reject the presence of adverse selection, the
implication would be that  h q  is in fact observable to landlords.
The village
The data used in this paper stem from two detailed field surveys carried in the Tunisian
village of El Oulja in 1993 and 1995.  The reader is referred to Ai, Arcand and Ethier (1998)
                                                       
13 Note that it is important from the theoretical standpoint that our measure of household productivity  h q  be
uncorrelated with observable household characteristics  h Z , and this will be the case by construction.28
for a description of the data.
14  That the village does in fact correspond to a compact society in
which labor is relatively immobile, as we alluded to in the introduction, is reflected by the fact
that an elderly woman who arrived in the village 60 years ago from a neighboring community
as a result of marriage is still refered to as “the stranger”.  This impression is also confirmed
by the average difference between the date of birth of the inhabitants and the date at which
they arrived in the village, which is essentially zero.  Table I provides summary statistics for
those variables that will constitute the basis of our empirical work.  The relative fluidity of the
land rental market is reflected in the Lorenz curves presented in Figure 1 : the Lorenz curve
associated with the distribution of land ownership is Lorenz-dominated by the Lorenz curve
associated with the distribution of the total amount of land farmed by a given household,
reflecting the significant role played by the land rental market in reducing differences in the
marginal product of land across different households.
Results : estimating the production technology
and constructing our measures of household productivity
The results of estimating equation (26) by nonlinear least-squares with household-specific
fixed effects are presented in Table II.  As expected in the case of developing country
agriculture long run returns to scale are approximately constant, as indicated by the estimate
of n .  There is little substitution between the aggregate land input and the aggregate labor
input, as indicated by the low value of  r .  The estimated upper-level production function is
thus quite near a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function whose
arguments are aggregate labor and aggregate land input.  There is relatively little
substitutability between family and hired labor as indicated by the small (and marginally
significant) value of  P.  This is unsurprising in light of the clear division of tasks between
hired and family labor that we observed in the village during field work.  A kernel estimation
of the distribution of the resulting household-specific fixed effects is presented in Figure 2.
Table III presents the results from purging the fixed effects of the impact of observable
household characteristics. It is worth pointing out that the total amount of owned land
cultivated by the household has a negative effect on the household-specific fixed effect, while
total hectares cultivated does not appear to have any significant impact. As would be
                                                       
14 Earlier studies of this village include Matoussi and Nugent (1989) and Laffont and Matoussi (1996).  These
studies are based on surveys carried out in 1985 and 1986, and survey design was not compatible with our own.29
expected, the labor endowment of the household has a statistically significant positive impact
on the household-specific fixed effect.
A puzzle emerges with respect to the average level of schooling of household members,
which has a significantly negative impact on the household-specific fixed effect.  This result
has been obtained by a number of researchers working on African agriculture.
15  The
consensus that appears to be emerging is that the most likely explanation for the negative
impact of human capital on various measures of the productivity of agricultural households is
that household members who are particularly productive (and observably so), are drawn away
from agricultural activity per se (the literature summarized in FAO (1998) also points in the
same direction).  This would appear, moreover, to be particularly true for female household
members whose contribution to agricultural output within the framework of team production
may not be adequately recognized within a male-dominated society.  Furthermore, since non-
agricultural activities may provide a level of remuneration that is more comensurate with the
level of qualifications attained by relatively well-qualified female household members, it is
perhaps not surprizing that they are increasingly drawn away from agricultural production for
purely individually rational motives.  Diversification of sources of household income into
non-agricultural activities that require a higher level of human capital than agricultural
production may also explain why such behavior is rational even in the context of unitary
models of household behavior.  Regardless of the operational motive, non-agricultural
activities provide a substantial portion of total household income for a number of households
in the village, and access to these activities is relatively easy.  We would therefore conjecture
that the aforementioned hypotheses provide a plausible explanation for the observed puzzle.
Turning now to the endowment in human capital of the household head, one might expect
experience, proxied by age, and schooling to significantly affect the household-specific fixed
effect : they do not.
16 Livestock ownership, for its part, has no significant impact on
agricultural productivity, which is unsurprising given the relatively limited importance of
animal draft power in the village (this is in sharp contrast to other environments, such as
                                                       
15 So much so that it was one of the principal topics discussed at a recent symposium held in Ouagadougou (see
AUPEL-UREF, 1999).  A typical example stems from the estimation of frontier production functions.  See
Audibert, Mathonnat, Nzeyimana, and Henry (1999).  Numerous references on the topic of rural non-farm
income are summarized in FAO (1998).
16 A well-known argument put forward by Jamison and Lau (see their reply to criticisms of their work in Jamison
and Lau, 1987, and the references cited therein) holds that the human capital of peasants is particularly important30
village India). Agricultural machinery ownership, on the other hand, is an important
determinant of household productivity. Figure 3 presents a kernel estimate of the distribution
of our measure of potentially unobservable household productivity, given by the residual of
the equation presented in Table III.  The first part of Table VII presents summary statistics
regarding the estimated household-specific fixed effect, our scalar measure of observable
household characteristics, and our measure of household-specific productivity.
5. TESTING FOR THE PRESENCE OF ADVERSE SELECTION
It should be clear from the summary at the end of the theoretical portion of this paper that the
first hypothesis that we aim to test is whether contractual choice is independent of the tenant’s
potentially unobservable level of productivity.  A priori, this could be done by estimating a
simple probit regression in which the dependent variable takes on the value of one when the
plot is cultivated by a sharecropper, and zero when the plot is rented out under a fixed rental
contract.  Before proceding with this test for the presence of adverse selection based on
contractual choice, it is important to note however, that the subsample of plots cultivated
under tenancy contracts (113 plots) is not chosen randomly, since we also have a large
number of observations corresponding to owner-operators (306 plots) in the sample used to
estimate the production technology.  Failure to control for this potential source of sample-
selection bias in the contractual choice equation might lead to incorrect inference regarding
the impact of tenant household productivity on the choice between sharecropping and fixed
rental contracts.  Given that the equation (contractual choice) that is potentially subject to
sample-selection bias corresponds to a problem of discrete choice, the appropriate empirical
procedure is to estimate the renting out and contractual choice equations simultaneously using
full information maximum likelihood (FIML), in order to exploit any correlation that may
exist between the disturbance terms of the two equations while concomitantly controling for
sample selection problems.  This corresponds to the censored bivariate probit model
implemented, for example, by Boyes, Hoffman and Low (1989).
17
                                                                                                                                                                            
in environments in which technological change is occuring.  This was not the case in the village in question
during the two years under consideration.
17 A simple Heckman-Lee procedure is not, unfortunately, appropriate when the equation subject to sample-
selection bias corresponds to a problem of discrete choice; moreover there is a gain in the efficiency stemming
from simultaneous estimation.31
The decision to rent out
The basic specification is thus given by (i) a renting out equation and (ii) a contractual choice
equation.  In the renting out equation, the dependent variable is equal to one when the plot is
rented out under a sharecropping or fixed rental contract and equal to zero when it is
cultivated by an owner-operator (later on, we will also use  a renting out equation in order to
assess the validity of our measure of household productivity as it applies to landlords).  The
baseline results from estimating the renting out and contractual choice equations by censored
bivariate probit are presented in the first column of Table IV (for the renting out equation) and
the first column of Table V (for the contractual choice equation).  We begin by discussing the
results corresponding to the renting out equation, where the explanatory variables are
constituted by plot characteristics (four soil dummies, an irrigated plot dummy and plot area
in hectares), a year dummy, two crop dummies (wheat and other grains, and garden
vegetables), and two characteristics of the landlord: the peasant landlord dummy is equal to
one when the landlord associated with the plot is herself a peasant, while the resident landlord
dummy is equal to one when the landlord in question resides in the village.
First, it is interesting to note that plot size has an important positive impact on the probability
of renting out. This may correspond to omitted plot characteristics being correlated with plot
size (smaller plots tends to be associated with a higher level of output per hectare and may
therefore be assigned on a priority basis to owner-operatorship), but it may also stem from
resource constraints faced by landlords who are unable to effectively cultivate particularly
large plots themselves.  Moreover, as we will argue below, plot size does not appear to be a
choice variable controlled by landlords, who are thus unable to perfectly adjust the size of
their holdings to its optimal level through the land rental market.  Second, the peasant
landlord and resident landlord dummies both have a significantly negative impact on the
probability of renting out. This is to be expected : non-peasant landlords have manifestly self-
selected out of agricultural production, while non-resident landlords, though some do
cultivate plots as owner-operators, face substantial transaction costs in working their own
land.
Contractual choice
The specification of the contractual choice regression is given by :32
(30)        Pr[1]
T
iihih SHAREQ fhqx ==++ ,
where 
T
h q  is the previously constructed measure of household productivity, as it applies to
tenants (hence the “T” superscript, in order to distinguish it from household productivity as it
applies to the landlord, which we will denote by 
L
h q ), and  i SHARE  takes on the value of one
when the plot is rented out under a sharecropping contract and zero when it is cultivated under
a fixed rental contract.  The matrix of explanatory variables  i Q  includes a dummy variable
that indicates whether the two parties to the contract were involved in a similar contractual
relationship during the previous agricultural season in order to control for the potential impact
of repeated interaction (more on this below);  i Q  also includes two characteristics of the
landlord that may affect contractual choice. First, we include the resident landlord dummy.  A
priori, one might expect non resident landlords to have a preference for fixed rental contracts
(since sharecropping contracts involve substantial managerial input on the part of landlords,
see Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985, for the standard arguments based on double-sided moral
hazard).  Second, we include the peasant landlord dummy : landlords who are themselves
farmers may be better able than others to mitigate informational concerns stemming from
knowledge of the agricultural technology. Finally, agricultural year and plot area controls are
included.
Our null hypothesis that there are no adverse selection problems in the village is given by:
0 :0 H h = , while the alternative hypothesis is that adverse selection concerns are significant
and is given by  :0 A H h „ .   The results for the contractual choice equation which, it should
be recalled, is estimated simultaneously with the renting out probit, are presented in the first
column of Table V.  Note that the estimated correlation between the disturbance terms in the
renting out and contractual choice equations (given by  r ) is not significantly different from
zero, indicating that sample selection bias in the contractual choice equation should not be of
particular concern.
The most important result is that the null hypothesis of no adverse selection, corresponding to
a statistically insignificant coefficient associated with our measure of tenant productivity
(
T
h q ), is strongly supported by the data : the coefficient is equal to –0.097 with an associated
z-statistic of -1.13. This result firmly rejects the theoretical result derived in PROPOSITION 6
and supports the indifference result given by PROPOSITION 3.  In terms of contractual choice33
(i.e., choosing between sharecropping and fixed rental contracts), it would appear that adverse
selection plays no important role in this village.
Discussion
While the preceding result in terms of contractual choice suggests that asymmetric
information in the form of adverse selection does not exist in the village, it would appear to be
worthwhile to investigate whether our measures of household productivity are in fact credible
empirical representations of their theoretical counterparts.  In other words : can we be
reasonably confident, based on additional empirical evidence driven by our theoretical
construct, that our measures do in fact correspond to household productivity ?  In what
follows, we present just such a test by considering the relationship linking the decision to rent
out (versus choosing to cultivate the plot oneself) and our measure of household productivity
as it applies to landlords.
In the case of the first-best optimum, the profit of the landlord if she rents out her land (be it
under a sharecropping or a fixed rental contract, given the indifference result derived at the




where, transposing the empirical notation of part 4 into the theoretical model,  (,)
TT Z lq  is
the household-specific fixed effect of the tenant (recovered from estimation of the production
function).  If the landlord chooses to cultivate the plot as an owner-operator, the





LL Z lq  is the household-specific fixed effect of the landlord (again stemming from
estimation of the production function) and we recall that  R  is the landlord's reservation level
of welfare (see the brief discussion following PROPOSITION 2).   By the Envelope Theorem, it


































It follows that the probability of the landlord choosing to lease out her land is a decreasing









ceteris paribus, more productive landlords are more likely to cultive their own land as owner-
operators.  Note, since there is no reason a priori to suppose that landlords do not know their
own productivity 
L q , that the derivative in question is respect to the landlord’s household-
specific fixed effect  (,)
LL Z lq , and not with respect to 
L q .  There is, of course, a problem
associated with this estimation stemming from the presence of a substantial number of
landlords who did not cultivate any land themselves, and for whom no value of  (,)
LL Z lq
therefore existed.
18  We therefore proceeded in two manners.  First, we estimated the renting
out equation on the subsample of observations which corresponded to peasant landlords.
Second, we carried out the estimation by setting  (,)0
LL Z lq =  for those landlords for whom
(,)
LL Z lq  did not exist since their household-specific fixed effect in agricultural activity
must presumably have been extremely low for them to have chosen not to cultivate any land.
The results do not differ qualitatively and we therefore present those results corresponding to
the second option in the last two columns of Table IV.  In column 2 of Table IV we include
the peasant landlord and resident landlord dummies alongside  (,)
LL Z lq , whereas in column
3  (,)
LL Z lq  appears alone : in both cases, the probability of renting out is a decreasing
function of  (,)
LL Z lq  and the associated coefficient is highly significant, as is predicted by
our theoretical model.  This simple test therefore provides additional confirmation that the
fixed effects extracted from production function estimation do in fact constitute credible
representations of household productivity.  Moreover, this test is squarely geared towards
rejecting the validity of our empirical measure of aggregate household productivity since it is
based upon information (the fixed effects) recovered from an estimation procedure that is
based upon the household cultivating a given set of plots, which is then applied to plots that
the household in question does not cultivate (the plots rented out).
A further test of our theoretical model is provided by a particularly strong implication of our
simple theoretical construct when combined with our finding, based at least on contractual
                                                       
18 For a number of plots the landlord is the Tunisian army, while for several others, despite our efforts during
fieldwork, we were unable to satisfactorily identify the landlord.35
choice, that landlords do in fact observe 
T
h q .  Recall from PROPOSITION 3 that the landlord
will be indifferent, in the absence of adverse selection, between renting out under a
sharecropping or a fixed rental contract.  Since 
T
h q  would appear to be observable to
landlords, the distinction between 
T
h q  and  (0,)
T Z l  is moot.  Therefore, if our theoretical
model is correct and there is no adverse selection, it must be the case that contractual choice is
independent not only of 
T
h q , but of  (,)
TT Z lq  as well.  In column 2 of Table V we therefore
replace 
T
h q  by  (,)
TT Z lq , whereas in column 3 we include 
T
h q  and  (0,)
T Z l  (our scalar
measure of household productivity based upon observable household characteristics)
simultaneously.  In column 2, the coefficient associated with  (,)
TT Z lq  is statistically
indistinguishable from zero, while the same is true of the coefficients associated with 
T
h q  and
(0,)
T Z l  in column 3.  Thus, a particularly strong implication of our model when there is no
adverse selection is not rejected by the data.
The transfer function
The second hypothesis, related to the presence of adverse selection, that we aim to test is
whether the transfer function from the landlord to the tenant on plots under cost-sharing
contracts is effectively an increasing or a decreasing function of the tenant’s productivity 
T
h q .




ihihih tW fmqz =++ ,
where  ih z  is the corresponding disturbance term and  i W  is a matrix of explanatory variables
constituted by the appropriate inverse Mills ratio (in order to control for potential sample-
selection bias) stemming from our previous probit estimation of the determinants of
contractual choice (column 1 of Table V), and plot size in order to account for possible scale
effects.
Our null hypothesis that there is no adverse selection problem in the village is represented by:
0 0 H m =< , while the alternative hypothesis is that adverse selection concerns are significant
and is given by  0 A H m => . Results for the estimation of equation (32) are presented in the
first column of the upper portion of Table VI.  Here again, the data strongly support the null36
hypothesis of no asymmetric information.  The coefficient associated with our measure of
unobserved tenant productivity is equal to –5.546, with an associated p-value of 0.02 (t-
statistic of –2.37).  The theoretical hypothesis corresponding to PROPOSITION 1 (the transfer
function is decreasing in  q  in the absence of asymmetric information) is not therefore
rejected by the data, whereas the hypothesis corresponding to PROPOSITION 4 is.
It is interesting to note that this finding supports our initial assumption that factor
endowments are such that relatively numerous, sufficiently well-qualified, tenants compete
for relatively scarce tenancy contracts.  If we consider the alternative hypothesis that
landlords compete for relatively scarce tenants, it is intuitively obvious (and easy to prove
analytically) that the transfer function must continue to be an increasing function of 
T
h q  for
landlords to be able implement an incentive compatible selection mechanism in the presence
of adverse selection.  For the case in which 
T
h q  is known to landlords, on the other hand,
landlords will be driven down to their individually rational level of welfare, and (in contrast to
what obtains when tenants are relatively abundant) the transfer function will also be
increasing in 
T
h q .   Our empirical results with respect to the transfer function, which we found
to be decreasing in 
T
h q , therefore support both the hypothesis that 
T
h q  is known to landlords
and our initial hypothesis that tenants are relatively abundant and land is relatively scarce.
19
Cost shares
It should be obvious from the logical standpoint that if, as we have found,  /0
T
ihh dtd q < , then
it must be the case that PROPOSITION 2 (ii) holds, namely that it cannot be the case that all cost
shares are decreasing in 
T
h q .  It may be asking too much of the data to hope that  ji b  will be an
increasing function of 
T
h q  for a substantial number of factor inputs (indexed by  j ), substantial
enough to ensure, that is, that we do in fact have  /0
T
ihh dtd q < .  Nevertheless, the second part
                                                       
19 Another strong assumption made at the outset in the theoretical model was that the individually rational level
of welfare of tenants was independent of their household productivity q .  In order to test this hypothesis, we
regressed non-agricultural income, which may provide a measure of outside opportunities available to tenants,
on observable household characteristics and  q .  We found non-agricultural income to be independent of q , as
we had postulated.  Moreover, in conformity with our arguments revolving around the puzzling (negative)
coefficient associated with human capital in the procedure by which we purged the household-specific fixed
effects of observable household characteristics, the maximum level of schooling attained by a household member
was a statistically significant determinant of non-agricultural income.37
of Table VI presents the results obtained from estimating the following cost-share equation
for each of the ten factors inputs under consideration :
,1,...,10
T
jihijhijih Yj bJsqk =++= .
Our null hypothesis for the presence of adverse selection is that a substantial number of  j s ’s
are negative, whereas in the absence of adverse selection (that is, if landlords do in fact
observe 
T
h q ), a substantial number of  j s ’s must be positive.  Since  ji b  is bounded by zero
below and by one above, it would appear to be essential to estimate this equation using a tobit
procedure.  Alternatively, since  ji b  takes on a limited number of discrete values (0, 0.50,
0.66, 0.70, 0.75, 1) it would appear equally reasonable to estimate the equation by ordered
probit.  We did both.  Remarkably, none of the ten different estimated  j s ’s was negative and
significantly different from zero, either in the tobit or in the ordered probit specifications.
Since the ordered probit which, in our opinion, is that most faithful to the structure of the data,
classified observations into two broad categories ( ji b = 0 versus  ji b  = 1), we present the
simpler probit estimates corresponding to the dependent variable being equal to one when  ji b
= 1 (the peasant bears the entirety of the costs associated with the input in question) and
ji b =0 otherwise.
20  As is clear from the results presented in the lower portion of Table VI, all
cost shares are non-decreasing in 
T
h q , and it is only for the case of the plowing and irrigation
shares that  j s  is non-significantly different from zero.
In order to convince ourselves that these results were robust to changes in specification, we
also estimated the preceding relationship by a probit procedure with input-specific random
effects, in which the dependent variable was identical to the simple probits presented above,
but where each input-specific block was stacked so as to produce a 393-dimensional vector.
21
That is, we estimated
11
jNjN T
ihijhijih jj Y bJsqik
==
== =+++ ￿￿ ,
where  j i  is the input-specific random effect.  The results are presented in the second part of
Table VI, below the corresponding cost share equation (we only present the input-specific
slope coefficients), and confirm the findings based upon the individual cost share equations.
                                                       
20 The tobit and ordered probit results are available from the authors upon request.38
The result also holds when the coefficients associated with the different cost shares are
restricted to being equal, as is shown by the results presented in the second column of the
upper portion of Table VI.
These results provide strong support for our previous finding based upon the transfer
function: on the basis of the relationship between each cost share and 
T
h q , contractual
relations in the village do not appear to be characterized by adverse selection.  On the
contrary, all of the evidence that we have presented strongly supports the contention that 
T
h q
is observable to landlords.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Given that all of the empirical results presented in this paper suggest that there is no adverse
selection and that our theoretical model provides a reasonable description of contractual
relations in the village, it would appear to be interesting to investigate the functioning of the
land rental market more closely.  We also offer some evidence that plot size is not a choice
variable available to landlords, an assumption that constituted a key aspect of our theoretical
model.  It would also appear to be worthwhile, since adverse selection does not appear to
provide an explanation for contractual choice in the village, to briefly consider what does.
We do so by providing some limited evidence based upon the dynamics of contractual
relationships.  These last results also indicate that our basic findings are not driven by
problems stemming from simultaneity bias.
The land rental market and the choice sets of landlords
The question we seek to answer is the following : what assumption regarding the choice sets
of landlords, in terms of the potential tenants that they may rent out their land to, is most
consistent with our data ?  For plots that are effectively cultivated under sharecropping or
fixed rental contracts, it is obvious that we have the information pertaining to the productivity
of the tenant.  For plots under owner-operatorship, on the other hand, we must impose some
form of theoretical structure in order to obtain a measure of the productivity of the potential
                                                                                                                                                                            
21 We estimated using a probit procedure with random effects because, as pointed out by Hsiao (1986, pp. 158-
163), fixed effects procedures do not produce consistent estimates of the slope parameters that are of interest,
hence the resort to random effects.39
tenant who was in fact rejected by the landlord.  The strategy here is exploratory : construct
different measures of the productivity of the potential tenant that the landlord rejected in favor
of owner-operatorship, and see which assumption gives the most reasonable result in a renting
out probit.
In the case of the first-best optimum, which is consistent with our previous empirical findings,
the most obvious solution is to assume that information flows perfectly in the village and that
a landlord who cultivates a plot herself therefore rejected the most productive available tenant.
Given the relative factor endowments of land and labor, it is unlikely that there is excess
demand for tenants.  And our assumption that tenants are driven down to their individually
rational level of welfare squares with observed factor endowments, with the aforementioned
hypothesis and, more importantly (as noted above) with our finding that the transfer function
is indeed decreasing in 
T
h q .
Let L denote the set of all potential tenants, indexed by their total productivity, available to
the landlord, from which we exclude the landlord herself if she rented in land, that is
(,)
LL Z lq ˇL.  Then the previous hypothesis, which we may refer to as "perfect matching"
implies that the rejected tenant was a tenant whose total productivity  (,)
TT Z lq , was defined
by
{ } (,)(,)(,)(,),(,)
TTTTTTTTTT ZZZZZ lqlqlqlqlq =˛L‡"˛L %% %% .
An alternative hypothesis corresponds to a land rental market in which, despite the absence of
adverse selection concerns, contractual arrangements are based on kinship or long run
relationships among tightly-knit subgroups of households.  One particular subgroup of
households that would appear to be relevant for a given landlord is given by the set of tenant
households with which, if she does indeed rent out some land, she engages in contractual
relationships.  We will refer to this hypothesis as that of "limited matching".  Let 
L L￿L
denote the set of tenants to which the landlord in question rents out land.  We may then define
the rejected potential tenant as
{ } (,)(,)(,)(,),(,)
TLTLTLTLLTLTLTLTLTLTLL ZZZZZ lqlqlqlqlq =˛L‡"˛L %% %% .
Other market structures are also possible.  Suppose that, despite the absence of adverse
selection, landlords and tenants are matched randomly.  That is, once a pair constituted by a
given landlord and a given tenant has been formed, the outcome is given by the first-best40
optimum ; but the formation of the pair in question obtains in a random fashion. Then a
landlord who chooses to cultivate a given plot herself did so because the expectation of the
productivity of the tenant with which she would have been matched was sufficiently low that
it was in her interest to cultivate the plot under owner-operatorship.  Under ASSUMPTION B
(multiplicative productivity), and assuming that the potential tenant in question belongs to L,












˛L = , corresponds to the assumption that the
potential tenant belongs to 










if the market structure that one is assuming in each case constitutes a reasonable
approximation to what actually obtains in the village. On average, each landlord faces a total
of 1.18 tenants, with a non-negligible number landlords facing two or more tenants.  The
potential for a significant difference between perfect matching and random matching therefore
exists in the data.
The second part of Table VII provides summary statistics on those variables generated under
the four matching procedures described above.  All summary statistics are provided for the
full sample of plots, for those plots under owner-operators, and for plots that are rented out.
Table VIII provides results corresponding to the comparative statics regarding the decision to
rent out given by equation (33).
Any reasonable matching procedure must necessarily be associated with a positive coefficient
on the generated value of potential tenant productivity, and this is the criterion we adopt in
order to identify those matching procedures that are manifestly inconsistent with the data.
Since both perfect matching and perfect random matching produce negative coefficients
associated with tenant productivity, it follows that the set of potential tenants available to a
given landlord cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be held to be constituted by all
tenants potentially available in the village.  The implication is that the matching procedures
that the data, coupled with our hypotheses, do not reject outright are given by limited perfect
matching and limited random matching, with a likelihood ratio test coming down squarely in41
favor of limited perfect matching.
22   Thus, for a given contractual relationship, there is no
departure from the first-best optimum in the sense that landlords observe the productivity of
the tenant they are faced with.  On the other hand, our evidence suggests that, despite the
absence of informational asymmetries, the land rental market exhibits a substantial degree of
friction in that landlords effectively limit themselves to a relatively small set of  potential
tenants at any given time.  It is therefore possible that the total agricultural output of the
village could be greater if the choice sets used by landlords were more broadly based, in the
sense that landlords may, by restricting themselves to a limited set of tenants, be foregoing
potentially more productive matches.
Is plot size chosen by landlords ?
Recall from Table V, that contractual choice is independent of plot size.  This suggests that
some sort of sorting mechanism based on plot size, in the spirit of Allen (1985), does not
appear to be at work.   At this point, it would seem to be worthwhile answering the following
question : if plot size is not an instrument used, as Allen (1985) would have it, as a sorting
mechanism, what role does it play ? Or is plot size exogenously determined by plot rotation
and other purely technological concerns ?  The question is potentially important since a key
assumption made at the outset in our theoretical model was that plot size was fixed.
The simplest mechanism that could explain plot size, and thus render it a choice variable
controlled by landlords, would be to assume that landlords adjust plot size so as to equate the
marginal productivity of land across plots that they cultivate as owner operators with that on
plots rented out under tenancy contracts.  It would seem plausible, if evidence were to
indicate that landlords do not even carry out this simple arbitrage, to assume that plot size is
indeed fixed.
                                                       
22 In the first three columns of Table IX, we assess the importance of landlord and plot characteristics as
determinants of observed tenant productivity.  Here, the focus is more descriptive and we seek to answer
questions of the following type : do more productive landlords tend to match with more productive tenants ?
Are particularly productive tenants assigned plots with a given set of characteristics ? It is particularly interesting
to note that the repeated interaction dummy does not have any statistically significant impact in any of the
estimated relationships.  This confirms that adverse selection issues per se, even if they were present, are not
resolved through repeated interaction since one would expect, in that case, tenant productivity to be an
increasing function of the repeated interaction dummy.42
Consider a landlord, who owns L  hectares of land, and who must allocate that land between a
plot which she rents out (L) and a plot which she cultivates herself (LL - ).  Then her very
simple optimization problem, which constitutes a slightly more realistic alternative to that
presented in part 2, is given by :


















In the absence of adverse selection, since the individual rationality constraint is binding, this
simply boils down to




























Now assume the following :
ASSUMPTION E : 
2 ()/0 LLxLxx FFF -< .
ASSUMPTION E guarantees that the second order condition holds strictly and that our FOCs are
also sufficient.  We then have the following result :
PROPOSITION 7 : In the absence of adverse selection, and under ASSUMPTION E,
/0 dLdL
* > ,  /0
T dLd q
* > ,  /0
L dLd q
* < .
PROOF : see APPENDIX.
PROPOSITION 7 potentially provides an extremely simple explanation for the role played by
plot size in the contractual relationship : landlords might choose plot size so as to equate the
marginal productivity of land across plots of land that they own.  Notice that this would not
imply that the marginal product of land is equated across all plots, only that it is so on plots
controled by a given landlord.  Empirical results corresponding to a test of this hypothesis are
presented in the last column of Table IX.  Contrary to PROPOSITION 7, the size of plots that are
rented out is  decreasing in  (0,)
T Z l  and  independent  of  (,)
LL Z lq .  Thus, landlords
manisfestly do not adjust the size of plots that they rent out so as equate the marginal43
productivity of land across plots that they own. It would therefore seem plausible to assume
that plot size is indeed not a choice variable available to landlords.
Contract renewal
An interesting feature of the empirical results regarding contractual choice presented in Table
V was that the only variable which appeared to significantly influence the choice between a
fixed rental and sharecropping contract was whether the contract in question constituted a
renewal.  In what follows, we briefly consider (i) the determinants of contract renewal and, in
particular, its link to tenant productivity, (ii) differences in the determinants of contractual
choice between contracts that are renewals and those that are not, and (iii) the joint
determination of contractual choice and contract renewal within the context of a transaction
costs framework.
The admittedly limited information regarding the dynamics of the tenancy relationship linking
a landlord with a tenant that we have is furnished by our knowledge of whether a given
tenancy contract represents the renewal of the same contract from the previous year.  In order
to investigate how the renewal (or, equally interesting, the non-renewal) process operates, we
began by estimating a probit equation in which the dependent variable takes on the value of
one if the contract is a renewal, and zero otherwise.  The results are presented in the first
column of Table X.  We allowed the probability of renewal to be a function of our scalar
measure of tenant household characteristics  (0,)
T Z l  (the portion of the fixed effect predicted
by observable household characteristics), the resident and peasant landlord dummies, our
measure of tenant household productivity 
T
h q , plot size, and the usual soil and year dummies.
In order to control for potential sample selection problems, this equation was estimated by
FIML jointly with the renting out equation using the censored bivariate probit procedure.
Somewhat unexpectedly, the probability of a contract being a renewal of the previous year’s
arrangement is  decreasing in the productivity of the tenant or, in other words, short-term
contracts appear to be associated with higher productivity tenants.  Furthermore, this same
probability is increasing in plot size: there appears, therefore, to be some tradeoff involved,
regarding contract renewal, in which increased plot size compensates for low tenant
productivity, and vice-versa (recall however that contractual choice per se is independent of
plot size, see Table V, and that plot size does not appear to be a choice variable under the44
control of landlords).   What is puzzling is that, contrary to what one might expect, landlords
do not appear to use the threat of non-renewal of contracts as a means of obtaining higher
quality tenants.
23  There may, and this is likely in the context of a compact village society,
some egalitarian principle at work.
24
The “dumb-cousin” conjecture
An informed conjecture, given that we have found no evidence for the presence of adverse
selection in the village, is that those contracts that are renewed are between family members,
the tenant component of which would be unable to find gainful employment if a landlord who
is a relation (and a benevolent one at that) did not “automatically” provide a plot of land.  The
assumption of benevolence may be relaxed somewhat when one recalls that social obligations
in Tunisian society place a heavy responsibility on better-off family members to look after
their less fortunate cousins (and all the inhabitants of the village are, essentially, cousins).
Moreover, if the landlord involved did not provide the plot of land, it might well be the case
that she would be obliged to look after the household in question through income transfers
that might be greater than the opportunity cost of renting out the land in question to a low-
productivity family member.
Contractual choice and tenant productivity once more
In order to be sure that contractual choice was indeed independent of tenant household
productivity and that our previous results (presented in Table V) were not simply driven by a
                                                       
23 This finding is coherent with a result, presented in Table IX, and discussed in note 22, which shows that tenant
productivity is independent of the repeated interaction dummy.
24 It is important to be cautious in the interpretation of the coefficient associated with 
T
h q  in the preceding
estimation since the equation in question manifestly suffers from omitted variable bias.  If the contractual
relationship represents a renewal, then it is the productivity of the incumbent tenant which is observed, and we
do not know the productivity of the potential tenant who was rejected in favor of the incumbent.  However, we
do know that the productivity of the incumbent who was retained was higher than the productivity of the
alternative tenant who was rejected.  On the other hand, when the contract is not a renewal, we do not observe
the productivity of the incumbent tenant who was dropped, but we do observe the productivity of the tenant that
replaced her.  Moreover, we know, since it was not a renewal, that the productivity of this last tenant must be
larger than that of the previous incumbent.  It follows that the coefficient associated with the productivity of the
tenant observed, in what is essentially the second period of a two period-decision problem, actually represents
the combination of two effects that go in opposite directions.  Another way of seeing this is as follows : the
decision to renew is an increasing function of the  difference between the productivity of the first-period
incumbent and that of the alternative tenant who is available.  For contracts that are renewals, this difference is
increasing in the productivity of the observed tenant (the incumbent who stayed on); while for contracts that do45
problem of aggregation, we considered the determinants of contractual choice independently
on the two subsamples constituted by those tenancy contracts that represented renewals and
those that did not.  The results are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table X.  In the case of
tenancy contracts that do  not represents renewals of existing contracts, an increase in
(0,)
T Z l  significantly decreases the probability that the contract in question will be a
sharecropping contract, the  only example that we have encountered so far of contractual
choice being a function of either of the components that make up the tenant’s household-
specific fixed effect.  The coefficient associated with 
T
h q , on the other hand, was statistically
indistinguishable from zero, which confirms all of our earlier findings regarding the
independence of contractual choice with respect to tenant productivity.  For contracts that do
represent a renewal, on the other hand, contractual choice is independent of both components
of the tenant-specific fixed effect.
The nutrient-depletion hypothesis
Why might low productivity tenants be associated with contract that are renewed and high
productivity tenants be associated with a sequence of spot contracts, apart from explanations
based on egalitarian principles such as the "dumb cousin conjecture ?  In other words, can one
construct an explanation that is consistent with individually rational behavior on the part of
landlords ? One possibility is driven by the observation that the intensity with which one
works the soil will tend to reduce its productivity in the following period.  Since high
productivity tenants will use inputs more intensively, it follows that their second period output
will,  ceteris paribus, be lower, unless their higher level of productivity is sufficient to
compensate for nutrient depletion.  If this is not the case, then it may be in the interest of
landlords to rent out their plot under a contract that is renewed for a second period to low
productivity tenants, while renting using spot contracts to tenants of relatively high
productivity.  An algebraic illustration of the nutrient depletion hypothesis is given in the
APPENDIX.
                                                                                                                                                                            
not constitute renewals, this difference is decreasing in the productivity of  the observed tenant (the alternative
tenant who replaced the unobserved incumbent).46
Contractual choice, contract renewal and
 the (written) nature of contracts
Given that tenant productivity does not appear to be a significant determinant of contractual
choice, what is ?  First, note that our finding that contractual choice is independent of the
landlord’s place of residence and of her being a peasant herself (Table V) suggests that
transaction costs involving landlord characteristics do not constitute a satisfactory explanation
for contractual choice in the village, since both variables should, a priori, be associated with
higher transaction costs for landlords.  On the other hand, we do possess one direct measure
of transaction costs that are likely to be greater for plots under cost-sharing contracts (because
of the large number of cost share parameters that must be explicitly specified, as well as the
decisionmaking powers of the two parties to the contract that must also be explicitly spelled
out) : this is given by a dummy variable which indicates whether the contract in question was
written or oral.
A final source of concern regarding the empirical results on contractual choice presented in
Table V in light of the results regarding contract renewal presented above is that contractual
choice and contract renewal may be jointly determined, implying that contract renewal is in
fact an endogenous variable in the contractual choice equation.  The coefficient associated
with tenant productivity might therefore be inconsistent, and our basic result regarding the
independence of contractual choice and 
T
h q might be entirely be driven by simultaneity bias.
In order to assess whether this was indeed the case, and whether the (written) nature of
contracts was significantly related to contractual choice and contract renewal, we estimated a
system of three probit equations by full information maximum likelihood.  The three
equations were given by a contractual choice equation, a contract renewal equation and (in
order to incoporate the transaction costs concerns raised above) an equation in which the
dependent variable was equal to one when the contract was written and zero when it was oral.
Several aspects of the results, which are presented in Table XI, are worth highlighting.
25
First, cost-sharing contracts are much less likely to be written than are fixed rental contracts
(see column 1), which squares nicely with the transaction cost argument sketched above.
Second, when a contract represents a renewal, it is much less likely that it will be written
                                                       
25 We inserted a more detailed set of crop dummies in the contractual choice equation presented in column 3 of
the Table, first, in order to provide our system with several degrees of overidentification and, second, to see
whether a finer level of disaggregation at the crop level might affect the results : it does not.47
(again, see column 1); again, this is quite plausible, as one of the advantages of renewing a
contract is presumably given by the savings obtained by not having to stipulate all of the
contract terms in writing anew. Third, when contractual choice is included in the contract
renewal equation and is allowed to be an endogenous variable (column 2), it is not statistically
significant at the usual levels of confidence; however, as with the simple contract renewal
equation presented in column 1 of Table X, low productivity tenants are more likely to be
renewed. Our previous finding that low productivity tenants are more likely to be renewed is
thus robust to the joint determination of contractual choice and contract renewal.  Fourth,
when contract renewal is allowed to be endogenous in the contractual choice equation
(column 3), it is not longer statistically significant at usual levels of confidence.  On the other
hand, and this confirms our earlier findings in a single equation framework, contractual
choice continues to be independent of tenant productivity, even when we allow contractual
choice, contract renewal and the nature of the contract to be jointly determined.  This provides
further evidence that adverse selection is not present in this village.
The upshot
In accordance with a widely-held belief of many development economists, the empirical
results presented in this paper strongly support the absence of adverse selection, in terms of
the predicted relationship between contractual choice and tenant productivity, in terms of the
relationship linking the optimal transfer function from landlords to tenants to the productivity
of tenants, and in terms of the corresponding relationship for the share of the cost of each
factor input borne by the tenant.  While theorists may be disappointed by these results that
imply that the problem focused on by mechanism design does not appear to be important
empirically, at least in this village, the result in and of itself is, we would hasten to add,
interesting.  In particular, it provides the first rigorous empirical evidence that we are aware of
that, within a compact village society, adverse selection is indeed not present. Previous
empirical work on the same village (Ai, Arcand and Ethier, 1998) has shown that, while
statistically significant, moral hazard concerns are not a quantitatively important determinant
of resource allocation.  If both moral hazard (hidden actions) and adverse selection (hidden
types) do not lie at the root of contractual choice, and therefore at least in part at the heart of
departures from the first-best optimum, what does ? Or were Schultz (1964) and Cheung
(1968, 1969) right ?48
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 (ii) :  ()/0 dtd qq
* <  under ASSUMPTIONS B and C.
When  () Fx is homogeneous of degree  k , we know that  ()() x xFxkFx =  and
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But, from the FOC for the first best optimum under ASSUMPTION A (
1 () x Fx q








** - ￿￿ = ￿￿ - Łł
,51
which will be negative as long as  (0,1/2) k ˛ .
[Q.E.D.]
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 :
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 (i) :  ()/0 dd bqq
* >  under ASSUMPTIONS B and C.
Using the same two properties of homogeneous functions as in the previous proof, and
applying the FOC for a first best optimum under  ASSUMPTION B allows one to rewrite

























PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 (ii) : when  x is an  N -dimensional vector of factor inputs, it cannot
be the case that  ()/0, j ddj bqq
* <" .











for the case where  x is a scalar.  When  x is an  N -dimensional vector of factor inputs, the
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Of course, this condition is not sufficient.  On the other hand, if  ()/0 j ddj bqq
* <", then it
would impossible for the transfer function to be decreasing in q .
[Q.E.D.]
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 :  ˆ()/0 dtd qq ‡  under ASSUMPTION B (Note that ASSUMPTION B
is used in the proof solely to guarantee that  ˆ()/ dxd qq  is positive.)
We know that the comparative statics of the optimal transfer  ˆ() t q  with respect to q  are given
by the incentive constraint (equation (8)) when it is evaluated at the solution to the landlord’s
problem :
















xx FxFx q qqqqqq =-- .52
It follows that:














PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.  Ambiguity of the sign of  ˆ()/ dd bqq  even under ASSUMPTIONS B




















Note that we can write equation (13), the individual rationality constraint (that must be
satisfied by the lowest productivity tenant, qq = ) as :








q qqqqqq ￿￿ ---+=-+= ￿￿
Łł ￿ .
It follows, under ASSUMPTION B, that the appropriate constant of integration is defined by :
1 ˆˆ (())()
2
KWFxx qqq =-+ .
Now recall, also under ASSUMPTION B, that we have 
1 ˆ()(1/) x xF qq
- = ; using the same two
properties of homogeneous functions as in the proof of  PROPOSITION 1 (ii), allows one to
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Now consider  ˆ()/ dxd qq .  Under ASSUMPTIONS B and C (again using the two properties of










Finally, consider  ˆ()/ dtd qq .  Using the same two properties of homogeneous functions, this
can be rewritten (see the proof of PROPOSITION 4 for the point of departure of the derivation)
as53
2
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[Q.E.D.]
DERIVATION OF THE OPTIMAL RENTAL CONTRACT UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION


















As with the case of the cost sharing contract this condition becomes globally sufficient for
































which, defining the tenant’s surplus as  ()(,())()() SYWFxxtW qqqqq =-=-+- , can be
rewritten as the following optimal control problem :


























By applying Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, one can show that the level of input under the
optimal rental contract, which we will denote by  ˆ ˆ() x q  is characterized by
ˆˆ ˆˆ (,())1()(,())0 xx FxFx q qqqqqq -+-= ,
and that  ˆ ˆ()/0 dxd qq ‡  as long as the following condition is satisfied















(This condition is slightly different from the one for the cost sharing contract). One can then
show that the derivative with respect to q  of the optimal transfer function under the rental
contract is given by :









PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6 : Under ASSUMPTION B, the probability of choosing a fixed rental
contract over a sharecropping contract is an increasing function of q .
By a first order Taylor expansion around  ˆ() x q , one can write:
( ) Re










(A1) ( ) Re









It is obvious that this expression depends critically on the difference  ˆ ˆˆ ()() xx qq -  which, by
the FOCs that implicitly determine the level of inputs under the two contracts, may not be
signed unambiguously.  If  ˆ ˆˆ ()()0 xx qq -> , then a higher productivity tenant is more likely to
choose a fixed rental contract.  If the opposite is true, and if  ˆˆ ˆˆˆ (,())(()()) x Fxxx q qqqq -  is of
sufficient magnitude to outweigh the unambiguously positive expression  ˆ ˆ (,()) Fx q qq , then
higher productivity tenants will find it in their interest to choose a sharecropping contract.
Can more be said if we impose the stronger condition given by ASSUMPTION B?  In the case
of the fixed rental contract, we have, under ASSUMPTION B :
ˆˆ ˆˆ (())()(())1 xx FxFx qqqqq +-= .
This yields
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it follows that (recall equation (20’), which states that 
1 ˆ()(2/(3)) x xF qqq
- =- )
ˆ ˆˆ ()() xx qq ‡ ;
the landlord specifies a higher level of input under a fixed rental contract than under the
corresponding cost sharing contract, for a given value of q .  Substituting this expression into
equation (A1) implies that the higher the level of q , the higher the probability of choosing a
fixed rental contract.
[Q.E.D.]
ASSUMPTION D :  

















COROLLARY TO PROPOSITION 6 :  Under  ASSUMPTION D, the probability of choosing a
fixed rental contract over a sharecropping contract is a
decreasing function of q .
PROOF OF COROLLARY TO PROPOSITION 6.
Performing two first-order Taylor expansions around  ˆ ˆ() x q  in equation (20) (which implicitly
defines the  ˆ() x q ), and combining this with the implicit definition of  ˆ ˆ() x q  from the derivation
of the optimal rental contract under asymmetric information, it is possible to write the
difference between  ˆ() x q  and  ˆ ˆ() x q  as :
















Substituting this into the equation for the difference between the surplus under fixed rental
and the surplus under cost sharing (re-expressed as a Taylor expansion around  ˆ ˆ() x q ) yields :
2
Re
ˆ ˆ ()((,())) 1 ˆ ˆ ()()(,())
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&& ,
which will be negative when ASSUMPTION D is satisfied.
[Q.E.D.]
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7.
The proof follows by straightforward implicit differentiation of the three FOCs.  Carrying out
the differentiations, one obtains:














































































































AN ALGEBRAIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE NUTRIENT DEPLETION HYPOTHESIS.
The key assumption is that second period output is decreasing in first period input intensity
because of soil depletion.  We express this by posing: 
1
2
21 (,,)0 x Fxx q < , where 
2
21 (,,) Fxx q  is
second period output.  In order to simplify the exposition, we shall ignore the question of
discounting.  In the case of a two-period contract, that is, a contract that is renewed, the


























FxxFxxxWtt qq ￿￿ -+--=-- ￿￿
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.
This implies that the landlord’s optimization problem, in unconstrained form, can be
expressed as :
































where the superscript RENEW denotes a contract that is renewed for the second period.
Consider now a sequence of two single-period or “spot” contracts with tenant’s of the same
















Since the individual rationality constraint of the tenant is binding in both cases, we can, as
usual, transform these problems into the unconstrained variety ; the necessary conditions for



















Evaluated at the optimum, the landlord’s profit’s are therefore given by
( ) 11212 (,())()(,(),())()2
SPOT FxxFxxxW qqqqqqq
***** P=-+--
where the superscript SPOT indicates that this corresponds to a sequence of two spot
contracts.  Let us now consider the difference between the landlord’s profits under the two































Notice that it is immediate that  11 ()() xx qq
*** >  since, under the sequence of spot contracts, the
nutrient depletion externality is not taken into account. It follows that
11
11 (())(())0 FxFx qq
*** -<  so the difference between renewed and spot contracts is
decreasing in q  when it comes to profit stemming from the first period.  On the other hand,
when nutrient depletion is taken into account, second period output will necessarily be higher
in the context of renewed contracts, for a given level of tenant productivity :  22 ()() xx qq
*** > .
Now consider the differential with respect to  q  of the difference between second period
profits under the two contractual forms.  By a first-order Taylor expansion around
21 ((),()) xx qq





















This implies that :

























so that the difference between second period profits under the two contractual forms is
increasing in  q .  It follows that  ()/
RENEWSPOT dd q P-P  is composed of two parts, one
negative and one positive














If the first (negative) effect dominates the second (positive) effect, then the probability of
contract renewal will be decreasing in tenant productivity.58
Figure 1
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cultivated hectares owned hectares59
Table I
Summary statistics
Variables Description of the variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max % censored
observations
Output in dinars 6407.93 13268.86 0 110000 0.00
Factor inputs
Male family labor in person-days 90.93 114.20 0 864 3.10
Female family labor in person-days 22.10 65.82 0 660 68.33
Male hired labor in person-days 164.29 461.60 0 4180 26.19
Female hired labor in person-days 104.63 248.78 0 2310 62.38
Cost of irrigation in dinars 526.68 1183.06 0 14400 14.05
Cost of plowing in dinars 284.39 526.40 0 3780 4.29
Cost of seeds in dinars 413.53 1116.40 0 18060 6.67
Cost of fertilizer in dinars 536.99 1555.88 0 20120 5.48
Cost of manure in dinars 111.27 561.41 0 10000 65.48
Cost of herbicide in dinars 238.24 661.98 0 9200 27.62
Cost of transportation in dinars 241.85 630.57 0 5400 19.29
Cost of pre-harvesting in dinars 123.67 607.45 0 8500 73.33
Plot characteristics Description of the variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Plot area in hectares 3.87 7.41 0.13 70
Irrigated plot equals 1 when plot is
    irrigated, 0 otherwise
0.88 0.30 0 1
Type 1 soil equals 1 when soil is clay,
    0 otherwise
0.19 0.39 0 1
Type 2 soil equals 1 when soil is red
    earth, 0 otherwise
0.17 0.38 0 1
Type 3 soil equals 1 when soil is sandy,
    0 otherwise
0.47 0.50 0 1
Type 4 soil equals 1 when soil is barren ,
    0 otherwise
0.07 0.25 0 1
Year dummy equals 1 for 1993,
    0 otherwise
0.58 0.49 0 1
Peasant household characteristics Description of the variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Age of household head in years 52.48 51.5 15.14 48 57
Schooling of household head in years 3.56 1.5 4.47 0 20
Household size number of persons 7.11 6 4.54 2 27
Household endowment of
   prime-age males
proportion of
   household members
0.30 0.29 0.19 0 1
Household endowment of
   prime-age females
proportion of
   household members
0.28 0.25 0.17 0 0.71
Average schooling
   of household members
in years 3.99 4 2.70 0 16.25
Livestock ownership in dinars 4657 1170 11438 0 102450
Agricultural machinery
   ownership
in dinars 9500 1750 16346 0 110600
Share of cost borne by the
tenant (%), by factor input 100 75 70 66 50 0
Number of
observations
Family labor 26 3 - 1 8 1 39
Hired labor 22 - - - 13 4 39
Irrigation 5 - 1 1 29 5 41
Plowing 8 - - 1 10 19 38
Seeds 6 - - 1 33 1 41
Fertilizer 5 - 1 - 32 2 40
Manure 5 - - - 28 2 35
Herbicide 5 - 1 - 34 2 42
Transportation 9 - - - 27 6 42
Pre-harvesting 9 - - - 23 4 36
Number of observations 100 3 3 4 237 46 393
Note : summary statistics at the plot level based on full sample constituted by 420 plots ; household-level statistics
correspond to full sample of 160 households ; wage rate in village is of 6 dinars per day for male labor and 5 dinars per day
for female labor ; for the case of family labor, cost-sharing is carried out by the landlord sending her own family labor onto
the tenant’s plot ;  for all other factor inputs, it is the cost of the factor input  per se that is shared.60
Table II
Nonlinear least-squares estimates
of the production function with household-specific fixed effects
Uppermost Production function parameters Parameter  values t-statistics
Returns to scale (n ) 1.106 1.31
Substitution (r ) -0.237 -1.22
Distribution ( T a ) 0.889 13.49
Aggregate land input
Modified land input
Share (f ) 0.218 0.54
Elasticity (F) 0.254 0.90
Plowing share ( PLOW w ) -0.0001 -2.05
Irrigated plot dummy ( IR w ) 0.213 1.54
Soil types :
                   type 1 ( 1 w ) -0.411 -1.86
                   type 2 ( 2 w ) -0.459 -2.68
                   type 3 ( 3 w ) -0.617 -4.50
                   type 4 ( 4 w ) -0.453 -2.14
Chemical fertilizer and herbicide share ( CHEM w ) 0.002 0.00
Manure  ( MANURE w ) 0.216 0.18
Aggregate labor input
Substitution (P) -0.589 -1.52
Distribution ( F d ) 0.559 2.76
Number of observations 420
Note : t-statistic on returns to scale parameter corresponds to a one-sided test of the null hypothesis that  1 v £ .  All other t-
statistics correspond to two-sided tests.  Soil types are clay (type 1), red earth (type 2), sandy (type 3) and “cucurbite” (type 4,
which corresponds to lumpy soil); type 4 soil is also sometimes refered to by villagers as being “barren” soil ; excluded soil
type is constituted by mixes of the preceding four soil types.
Figure 2
Kernel estimation of the distribution of household-specific fixed effects ( (,) Z lq )
Kernel estimate of the distribution of household-specific fixed effects





Note : dotted line corresponds to a kernel estimate of the density of  the household-specific fixed effects ; smooth
line corresponds to a normal density with same mean and variance as the sample.61
Table III








Age of household head -0.001
(0.21)
Household endowment of male labor 0.532
(3.49)
Household endowment of female labor 0.363
(2.34)
Schooling of household head -0.009
(-1.25)
Average schooling of household members -0.031
(-2.74)
Total owned hectares cultivated by household -0.102
(-3.89)
Total hectares cultivated by household -0.027
(-0.95)
Livestock ownership (in dinars) -0.002
(-0.26)
Agricultural machinery ownership (in dinars) 0.039
(5.59)
R-squared 0.17
Number of observations 413
Note : method of estimation is OLS; no problems of heteroskedasticity were detected by the usual tests; 7 observations
dropped with respect to production function estimates because of missing variables for certain household characteristics
Figure 3
Kernel estimation of the distribution of household productivity (q )







Note : dotted line corresponds to a kernel estimate of the density of household productivity ; smooth line corresponds to a
normal density with same mean and variance as the sample.62
Table IV
Correcting for sample selection bias : the determinants of the decision to rent out
Probit estimation : dependent variable = 1 when plot is rented out,


















Joint signif. test on landlord characteristics :  p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Plot characteristics






























































% correct predictions 91 97 91
Pseudo R-squared 0.62 0.71 0.57
Log likelihood -91.88 -46.29 -67.39
Number of observations 419 363 363
Note : z-statistics in parentheses; excluded crop dummy corresponds to all other crops; there are 363 observations in columns
2 and 3 (in contrast to column 1) because of landlords that we were unable to identify satisfactorily; there are 419
observations in column one, despite landlords that cannot be identified satisfactorily, because the residence status of the
landlord and the information of whether or not the landlord is a peasant was collected from the tenant who cultivated the plot.63
Table V
Contractual choice and tenant productivity




 = 1 when cost sharing,




 = 1 when cost sharing,




 = 1 when cost sharing,




















































Household-specific fixed effect of tenant : (,)
TT Z lq -0.158
(-0.43)
Observable tenant characteristics : (0,)
T Z l -0.381
(-0.48)





Joint test on observable tenant characteristics
and tenant productivity : p-value n.a. n.a. 0.52
Estimated value of  r  : correlation between selection








Log likelihood -158.62 -158.53 -158.46
% correct predictions 73 73 73
Number of observations 113 113 113
Note: the selection equation (the decision to rent out) and the contractual choice equation are estimated simultaneously by
full information maximum likelihood (FIML) using the censored bivariate probit procedure in order to control for potential
sample selection bias in the contractual choice equation. We report those contractual choice equations corresponding to the
selection equation specification given in column 1 of Table IV.  The estimated selection equations were all similar to that
presented in column 1 of Table IV, for all contractual choice equation specifications presented in Table V.64
Table VI





Dependent variable :  () bq
  = 1 when tenant bears all
        costs of the input
  = 0 otherwise
(input shares are stacked over all
contracts and all inputs)
(1) (2)










Inverse Mills ratio from cost










Number of observations 27 393
Note :  estimation in column 1 is by OLS corrected for sample selection bias by using the inverse Mills ratio stemming from
the contractual choice probit presented in column 1 of Table V; figures in parentheses in column 1 are t-statistics; estimation
in column 2 is constructed by stacking all of the cost shares (transformed into binary form) for each contract and for each
factor input, meaning that the number of observations is given by the number of plots under share tenancy multiplied by the
number of factor inputs; we estimate by probit with input-specific random effects; estimated value of  r  (the correlation of
the residuals for all observations for a given individual) is equal to 0.31 with an associated 
2 c  of 59.12 (p-value = 0.00) the
absence of random effects in the probit is therefore rejected in favor of the chosen specification.  Coefficient associated with














































































































































































































































































































































































































































Pseudo R-squared 0.25 0.24 0.07 0.15 0.50 0.40 0.79 0.38 0.49 0.46
% correct predictions 78 76 87 83 90 95 94 92 88 85
Number of observations 39 39 41 38 41 40 35 42 42 36
Dependent variable = 1 when tenant bears all costs of the input, = 0 otherwise (input shares are stacked over all contracts and all
inputs); coefficients associated with tenant productivity are allowed to be input-specific; method of estimation is probit with input-
specific random effects ; number of observations = 393 ; estimated value of  r  = 0.46 ,
























Note : for all probit estimations,  z-statistics are in parentheses; probit equation for share of irrigation costs did not converge
when year dummy is included; we therefore report results for the case in which the year dummy is excluded.  Number of
observations in the individual cost-share probits differ because of missing values; number of observations in the transfer









Observed values mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. Dev.
(,) Z lq  of household cultivating plot 6.69 0.49 6.78 0.44 6.66 0.50
(0,) Z l  of household cultivating plot 6.69 0.20 6.76 0.21 6.67 0.20
q  of household cultivating plot -0.00 0.44 0.02 0.37 -0.01 0.20
(,)
LL Z lq 6.04 1.98 2.74 3.28 6.66 0.50
(,)
TT Z lq n.a. n.a. 6.78 0.44 n.a. n.a.
(0,)
T Z l n.a. n.a. 6.76 0.21 n.a. n.a.
T q n.a. n.a. 0.02 0.37 n.a. n.a.
Generated values:
mean std. dev.
0 H: obsge mm =
p-value mean std. Dev.
Perfect matching :  (,)
TT Z lq 7.19 0.36 0.00 7.35 0.13
Limited perfect matching :  (,)
TT Z lq 6.71 0.49 0.00 6.63 0.45
Perfect random matching :  T l m 6.80 0.23 0.23 6.81 0.04
Limited random matching :  T l m 6.69 0.43 0.54 6.63 0.45
Note : total number of plots = 419; plots under tenancy contracts = 113;  for limited matching subsample, the total number of
plots = 118 with 57 plots under tenancy contracts; we are able to accurately  identify the landlord on a total of 363 plots;
perfect matching measure based on the cutoff value of potential tenant productivity at the uppermost decile; limited perfect
matching measure based on maximum potential value of tenant productivity for the tenants with whom the landlord interacts;
limited random matching measure based on the average productivity of tenants with whom the landlord interacts;
productivity measures are expressed in thousands of Tunisian dinars; the hypothesis tested in the middle column of the
second part of the Table is that the generated potential tenant productivity equals observed tenant productivity, on those plots
actually under tenancy contracts ;  (,)
LL Z lq  on plots under  tenancy contracts calculated by posing  (,)0
LL Z lq =  for non-
peasant landlords (those landlords who do not cultivate any land themselves).66
Table VIII
The structure of the market for land : the determinants of the decision to rent out
Probit estimation : Dependent variable = 1 when plot is rented out, zero otherwise (z-statistic in parentheses)

















Joint signif. test on landlord characteristics : p-value 0.00 0.00 n.a. n.a.
Tenant characteristics
Perfect matching:  (,)
TT Z lq -4.508
(-4.41)
Limited perfect matching:  (,)
TLTL Z lq 3.571
(3.69)
Perfect random matching :  T l m -1.793
(-1.65)
Limited random matching:  TL l m 2.442
(3.02)
Plot characteristics


















































































% correct predictions 96 97 92 92
Pseudo R-squared 0.80 0.72 0.79 0.73
Log likelihood -49.48 -43.78 -17.16 -21.70
Number of observations 419 363 118 118
Note: in the case of the limited matching equations (columns 3 and 4), there are 61 plots under owner-operators, 24 plots
under sharecropping, and 33 plots under fixed rental contracts; estimation of perfect matching (column 1) did not converge
when the landlord-specific fixed effect was included because of colinearity with the tenant-specific fixed effect; we therefore
report results for the specification in which the landlord-specific fixed effect is excluded; in columns 3 and 4, all landlords
are residents of the village and peasants themselves.67
Table IX






































Inverse Mills ratio from
renting out probit estimation




































































































Observable tenant characteristics : (0,)
T Z l -2.288
(-3.32)
Tenant productivity : 
T q -0.469
(-1.32)
R-squared 0.38 0.48 0.17 0.56
Number of observations 57 57 57 5568
Table X










    = 1  when contract
            is a renewal
    = 0   otherwise
2
Dependent variable:
= 1 when sharecropping




= 1 when sharecropping
       contract
= 0 otherwise



























Soil dummies :  Type 1 0.352
(0.55)
                          Type 2 -0.690
(-1.08)
                          Type 3 -0.202
(-0.38)










































Estimated value of  r  : correlation between
selection equation (renting out) and contract




Log likelihood -155.41 -31.37 -25.31
% correct predictions 63 72 78
Number of observations 113 57 56
Note: as with the results reported in Tables IV and V, the selection equation (the decision to rent out) and the contract
renewal equation (presented in column 1 above) are estimated simultaneously by full information maximum likelihood
(FIML) using the censored bivariate probit procedure in order to control for potential sample selection bias in the contract
renewal equation. The selection equation (renting out) specification corresponds to that given in column 1 of Table IV.  In
columns 2 and 3, we correct for two potential sources of sample selection bias : (i) the plot being rented out, and (ii) the
contract being a renewal; we therefore introduced the predicted probability of the plot being rented out (obtained from the
censored bivariate probit results corresponding to the selection equation appearing in column 1 of Table IV), and the
predicted probability of the contract being a renewal, obtained from the results presented in column 1 above.69
Table XI
Contractual choice, contract renewal, and the nature of the contract
Method of estimation : Full information maximum likelihood (FIML)
Explanatory variables
Dependent variable:
    = 1  when contract
            is written
    = 0   otherwise
Dependent variable:
    = 1  when contract
            is a renewal
    = 0   otherwise
Dependent variable:
    = 1  when it is a share
            contract















Irrigated plot dummy -0.766
(-1.55)
Soil dummies:  Type 1 0.266
(0.40)
                         Type 2 -0.572
(-0.90)
                         Type 3 -0.268
(-0.46)





            Wheat -1.022
(-1.14)
             Other grains -0.860
(-0.81)
             Potatoes -0.865
(-0.96)
             Onions -1.207
(-1.29)
             Tomatoes -2.054
(-1.92)
             Garden vegetables -0.864
(-0.97)
             Melon -2.006
(-1.98)














Log likelihood = -176.07
Number of observations = 113
Note: system of three probit equations estimated by FIML; omission of written nature of contract in the renewal and share
equations was necessary in order  to achieve convergence.